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TERRORISM TRIALS & INVESTIGATIONS

Article III, the Framers, and al Bahlul: A Reply to Steve
By Peter Margulies

Tuesday, September 30, 2014, 8:23 PM

Steve’s post arguing that the military commission conviction of former bin Laden aide Ali Hamza al Bahlul for conspiracy to murder civilians
violates Article III does not do justice to the Framers’ carefully considered view of the interaction between Article III and Congress’s war powers. In
critiquing both the government brief and the amicus brief Jim Schoettler and I led in the D.C. Circuit for former JAGs, former national security
of cials, and scholars, Steve passes over the Court’s observation in Ex Parte Quirin that the Framers simply did not regard military tribunals as
“courts” triggering the strictures of Article III. Quirin noted that the Framers, who were familiar with military commissions because of General
George Washington’s use of such tribunals in the Revolutionary War, viewed commissions as an “important incident” of the power to authorize and
wage war, rather than a forum under Article III’s ambit. Steve’s view would compromise Congress’s war powers, while offering little additional
protection to the jury trial and grand jury rights that Steve rightly reveres. Steve, the government, and amici actually have a lot in common. Steve
concedes that Article I confers broad power on Congress to establish military commissions in the course of an armed con ict. Steve’s brief also
admits that military commissions have jurisdiction over a wide range of offenses when those commissions hear charges based on violations of
martial or occupation law. Steve could hardly do otherwise: as Milligan noted and Justice Stevens con rmed in Hamdan I, military commissions are
a “necessity” in these contexts because of the breakdown of “civil authority.” Steve is also right that there are some common-sense limits to the
jurisdiction of a commission hearing charges based on violations of the laws of war. The government and amici concede that such law of war
commissions cannot hear the ordinary criminal charges that courts of necessity may hear when civilian courts aren’t open. Rather, charges heard by
law of war commissions must have some reasonable relationship to the belligerency itself. However, once that condition is met, further limits based
on Article III are foreign to the Framers’ scheme. To understand Quirin’s view of Article III and law of war commissions, it’s useful to consult
America’s foremost law of war scholar, William Winthrop, whom the Quirin Court and Justice Stevens in Hamdan I cited repeatedly. After serving in
the Civil War, Winthrop write his monumental treatise, Military Law and Precedents. Volume 2 of Winthrop’s study de nes violations of the “laws
and usages of war” as including a wide range of acts committed in the context of armed con ict, including “trading or dealing with enemies.”
Trading with the enemy is not a violation of international law. However, as our amicus brief explains, trading with the enemy is an offense that
Winthrop believed a state could criminalize under its domestic law, selecting military commissions as the appropriate forum. Nothing in Quirin
suggests that the Court disagreed with Winthrop on this point. Indeed, Quirin is clear that both military courts of necessity and law of war
commissions “are not courts in the sense of the Judiciary Article.”
A more sweeping view of Article III’s constraints on Congress’s war powers would produce anomalous results. Under Steve’s view, the former bin
Laden aide al Bahlul, who has no U.S. ties, would gain greater protection under Article III than would a citizen of Missouri who aided the
Confederacy during the Civil War. That result seems perverse, since al Bahlul is a foreign national belligerent whose acts the en banc D.C. Circuit
found “directly relate” to the September 11 attacks. This anomaly would also undermine Congress’s exercise of its war powers. Martial law and
occupation commissions have a limited geographic scope. Restricting commission jurisdiction outside these narrow contexts would reduce
accountability for global terrorists. Steve’s view would preclude Congress from establishing military commissions to deter an individual, like al
Bahlul, who conspired to murder U.S. civilians during an armed con ict. That conspiracy is reasonably related to an acknowledged violation of
international law: the completed murder of civilians. Congress could reasonably nd that waiting for a completed act of murder poses too great a
risk, and that the prospect of military commission prosecution would enhance deterrence. The Framers could hardly have believed that Article III
bars Congress from supplementing deterrence in this way. Steve’s view is also not necessary to protect the rights guaranteed by Article III and the
Bill of Rights. The rights to jury trial and grand jury presentment are protected by reading Article III to permit commission jurisdiction over
conduct by a belligerent during an armed con ict. As Milligan makes clear, Article III’s prime role here is assuring that the government does not
misuse military commissions by trying ordinary citizens outside the criminal justice system. In drafting Article III, the Framers did not intend to
restrict Congress’s ability to establish commissions to try noncitizen belligerents with no U.S. ties engaged in armed con ict with the United States.
As future Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes explained almost a century ago, the ability to wage war implies the ability “to wage war successfully.”
Reading Article III as embodying Steve’s view would erode that power. In contrast, amici’s view avoids this anomaly while protecting our rights.
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